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Abstract
We consider a framework à la Wirl (1994) where political liberaliza-
tion is the outcome of a lobbying diﬀerential game between a conservative
elite and a reformist group, the former player pushing against political
liberalization in opposition to the latter. In contrast to the benchmark
model, we introduce uncertainty. We consider the typical case of an Arab
oil exporter country where oil rents are ﬁercely controled by the conser-
vative elite. We assume that the higher the oil rents, the more reluctant
to political liberalization the elite is. Two states of nature are considered
(high vs low resource rents). We then compute the Market-perfect equi-
libria of the corresponding piecewise deterministic diﬀerential game. It
is shown that introducing uncertainty in this manner increases the set of
strategies compared to Wirl's original setting. In particular, it is shown
that the cost of lobbying might be siginiﬁcantly increased under uncer-
tainty with respect to the benchmark. This ultimately highlights some
speciﬁcities of the political liberalization at stake in Arab countries and
the associated risks.
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1 Introduction
Rent-seeking activities in countries with developed extraction sectors are abun-
dantly documented. Examples range from timber industries in the Philippines
and Malaysia (as detailed in Ross, 2001) to fossil energy-related sectors like in
OPEC countries (see a recent paper by Gylfason, 2001). In general, the rents
deriving from the exploitation of natural resources fall under the ﬁerce control of
conservative elites. These elites typically manipulate national legislation (pretty
much in the sense given by Tullock (1967) to rent-seeking) to perpetuate them-
selves in power.1 Empirical evidence show that the so-called resource curse
can be a consequence of the latter behaviour. Bad governance and weak institu-
tions are the main reasons behind the failures of several resource-rich countries
to launch a sustainable growth process (see Gylfason, 2001, and more recently,
Mehlum et al., 2006). The resource curse is by no way the mere outcome of
an automatic mechanism penalizing these otherwise blessed countries.
On the other hand, the impact of rent-seeking behaviour on economic eﬃ-
ciency is a quite old idea tracing back to Tullock (1967) as already mentioned
above. Key aspects of the theory are the strategic and non-strategic behaviours
of the players involved in rent-seeking and their impact (and interaction) with
public policy. As players are roughly the representatives of interest groups in
practice, the theory ends up modelling the determinants and outcomes of lobby-
ing in diﬀerent theoretical contexts (see Becker (1983), Linster (1994), and Kohli
and Singh (1999) for more recent examples of the literature stream opened by
Tullock). An inﬂuential contribution is the one by Becker (1993). He modeled
lobbying in a two-player setting, each player with his own lobbying cost and pro-
ductivity. It was assumed that the larger lobbying expenditures, the stronger
the lobby and the more eﬀective a player can be in orienting public (ﬁscal)
policy. However, Becker's model does not entail any strategic behaviour of any
sort: each player acts as if the lobbying eﬀort exerted by the opponent is inde-
pendent of his own choice.2 Researchers after Becker have tried to get rid of this
shortcoming. To our knowledge, Wirl (1994) is the ﬁrst to use diﬀerential games
1The recent Arab Spring uprising shed light on another form of these long lasting rent-
seeking activities, not related to natural resources but to the control of ﬁnancial and trade
ﬂows as it was the case in Tunisia under the presidency of Benali.
2The main point made by Becker is that increasing competition among interest groups
should improve the eﬃciency of the tax system.
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in this stream of literature. Wirl uses a linear-quadratic model to investigate
the impact of the game structure on the outcomes expressed in terms of players'
strategies. Though the government is passive in this framework (in other words,
public policy only changes in response to lobbying actions), the paper has two
important contributions. First, the game structure matters (the open-loop equi-
libria are, indeed, carefully compared to the subgame-perfect equilibria derived
as linear Markov strategies). Second, in the subgame-perfect equilibria, optimal
lobbying expenditures are remarkably lower (than those observed in the open-
loop case). This provides a rationale for a conjecture made by Tullock. The
cost of rent-seeking activities are rather small compared to the rents, therefore
implying not too high social costs. The reason behind this striking result is
inherent in the feedback nature of the Markovian strategies, which discourages
too aggressive lobbying strategies (see Wirl, 1994, for more details).
This paper qualiﬁes this important claim by Wirl by introducing uncertainty.
If the players do not know with certainty the politico-economic environment in
the near and far future, and provided they are not too averse to risk, they might
well depart from the overly cautious behaviour described in Wirl (1994). This
is especially the case if they anticipate a favorable evolution of the environment.
We apply our framework to the process of liberalization in oil exporting coun-
tries, and more speciﬁcally to Arab countries. The Arab Spring has shown the
deep inequalities that characterize the Arab world. On one hand, there are rul-
ing dynasties who usually control all types of economic and political activities.
On the other, there is a majority of Arab citizens which are partially or totally
excluded from relevant decision-making. A fundamental characteristic of these
countries is the essential role played by the oil rents both on the political and
economic grounds (see Caselli and Cunnigham, 2009). The larger these rents
are, the bigger the incentives of the elites to stay in power and to block any
initiative to open the political game.3 In many Arab countries, starting with
the Gulf emirates and kingdoms, a lot has been already done towards economic
liberalization, notably in order to attract more foreign direct investment. How-
ever, no signiﬁcant move has been made in favor of political liberalization (see
3Gylfason (2001) makes the point that the elites would eventually block human capital
education to perpetuate themselves in power. As outlined by Boucekkine and Bouklia-Hassane
(2011), this is certainly not the case of Tunisia, the starter in the Arab Spring uprising: more
than 20% of the Tunisian budget has gone to public education in the last decade, much better
than many advanced European countries.
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Dunne and Revkin, 2011, on Egypt).4 We shall consider a framework à la Wirl
where political liberalization is the outcome of a piecewise deterministic diﬀer-
ential game between a conservative elite and a reformist group: oil rents may
be high or low (two states of nature). In the former state of nature, the elite
is more reluctant to political liberalization. In this context, we revisit Wirl's
ﬁndings and show how uncertainty alter the optimal strategies in the Markov-
perfect equilibria compared to the benchmark. Incidentally, we highlight some
of the speciﬁc risks inherent in the current political libearlization process in
Arab countries.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the dynamic model
of political liberalization. Section 3 considers a setting with uncertainty and
derives the MPE of a piecewise deterministic game. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Benchmark model
In this section, the diﬀerential game on lobbying proposed by Wirl (1994) is
adapted to the context of the Arab Spring. For the meantime, the case with
no uncertainty is discussed. In the next section, we extend Wirl's model by
considering a stochastic environment with two states of nature. Throughout
the paper, we consider only symmetric games (in the precise sense of Wirl, see
Section 2.1 just below). This is done for algebraic amenability, as no analytical
solution is allowed outside this class of games.It goes without saying that play-
ers engaged in the political liberalization struggle in Arab countries do not have
equal power since they do not have equal access to oil rents, etc.5 Nonetheless,
the symmetric set-up adopted hereafter includes two important ingredients of
the actual political liberalization game: the conservative elite is reluctant to po-
litical liberalization, while the reformist minority pushes for it. This reluctance
is an increasing function of oil rents. The former point will be apparent in the
stochastic extension of the benchmark described just below.
4Algeria is a case where even economic liberalization eﬀorts have been tightly linked to the
level of the oil barrel, as explained in Boucekkine and Bouklia-Hassane (2011).
5For example, in the Algerian case, the conservative elites beneﬁt from the support of the
powerful National Popular Army and the intelligence services (DRS).
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2.1 The setup
We consider two competing players (denoted as i = 1, 2) who engage in invest-
ment eﬀorts x1 and x2. Player 1 is a reformist who exerts pressure towards
greater political liberalization. On the other hand, Player 2 prefers a conser-
vative system. In the context of the Arab Spring, Player 2 can be considered
as the elite government who wants to retain the political status quo. Player
1 represents the groups who prefer regime change. The state of liberalization
is measured by z(−∞,∞). As in Wirl, z = 0 is the neutral level of political
liberalization. Indeed, the following diﬀerential equation formally captures the
evolution of z in response to the eﬀorts of players 1 and 2:
z˙ = x1 − x2, (1)
with z(0) = z0 given. As a reformist, player 1 prefers a higher level of political
liberalization. A high value of z, on the other hand, is not beneﬁcial to the
conservative stance of player 2. Consequently, the investment x1 of player 1
increases z, while player 2 exerts eﬀort x2 to lower z.
The beneﬁt from the current level of liberalization is denoted by αi(z) with:
α1(z) = a0 + a1z +
a2
2 z
2 and α2(z) = a0 − a1z + a22 z2. We follow Wirl (1994)
by qualifying this game as a symmetric one. The opposite signs of the second
term in the players' beneﬁt functions represent their antagonistic interests with
regard to liberalization. Without loss of generality, we assume that a1 > 0. We
also assume that a2 ≤ 0 to ensure concavity. Meanwhile, eﬀorts x1 and x2 are
also associated with cost γ(xi) =
d
2 (xi)
2.
Players maximize the present value of beneﬁts from liberalization minus the
associated costs, Fi = αi(z)−γ(xi). With an interest rate r > 0, players choose
eﬀort levels to maximize the following objective function subject to the evolution
of z (Equation 1):
maxxi(t)
ˆ ∞
0
e−rt{αi(z(t))− γ(xi(t))}dt (2)
Indeed, the solution to this diﬀerential game is essentially the same as the
symmetric version found in Wirl (1994). Consequently, in the next subsection,
we will merely summarize the resulting open-loop and feedback strategies. In
Section 3, we will provide a comprehensive solution to a game under uncertainty
and provide analytical comparisons.
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2.2 Open-loop and feedback strategies
As mentioned above, this subsection provides an overview of the open-loop and
Markov-perfect equilibrum (MPE) solutions to the political liberalization game
with no uncertainty. Similar to Wirl (1994), the strategy pair {xO1 (t), xO2 (t), t[0,∞)}
comprises an open-loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE) if both strategies, which
depend on t, maximize the respective objective functions of the players. In
summary, the open-loop case (presented in the feedback form) at a symmetric
equilibrium results to:
xO1 =
a1
rd +
1
4
[
r −√(r2 − 8da2)] z
xO2 =
a1
rd − 14
[
r −√(r2 − 8da2)] z, (3)
which leads the system to a unique steady state characterized by:
xO1∞ =
a1
rd
= xO2∞; z∞ = 0. (4)
While the open-loop equilibrium is time-consistent, it is not subgame perfect.
That is, using open-loop strategies might not make sense when considering an
anticipated change in the evolution of the game. Thus, following literature
(Dockner, et al. 2000), feedback strategies are deemed suitable. Utilizing the
usual Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations (refer to Wirl (1994), pg. 315
for a detailed discussion), the resulting MPE strategies in the case without
regime switching are (the superscript N is used here):
xN1 =
6a1
d
[
5r+
√
(r2− 12d a2)
] + 16
[
r −√(r2 − 12d a2)] z
xN2 =
6a1
d
[
5r+
√
(r2− 12d a2)
] − 16
[
r −√(r2 − 12d a2)] z (5)
which leads the system to a steady state characterized by:
xN1∞ =
6a1
d
[
5r +
√
(r2 − 12d a2)
] = xN2∞; z∞ = 0. (6)
The strategies computed have some interesting implications. First, note
that in the MPE, the strategy of player 1 is decreasing in z. This is in strong
contrast to player 2. In terms of our political liberalization framework, it means
that the reformist would exert less eﬀort when the level of political freedom
is rising. Meanwhile, the conservative will take the opposite way. Much more
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interestingly, one can use the previous feedback rules to conclude that xOi∞ >
xNi∞, for i = 1, 2, which is the main result of Wirl's benchmark. That is, lobbying
activities are lower in the MPE compared to the open loop, at least in the steady
state. Therefore, the social cost of lobbying activities are less signiﬁcant than
one may expect. This ﬁnding is conﬁrmed through some quantitative exercises.6
3 Political liberalization game under uncertainty
We now consider the dynamic game of political liberalization under a setting
with uncertainty.
3.1 MPE of the piecewise deterministic game
The symmetric case found in Wirl (1994) is extended by taking into account
the possibility of regime switching. A stochastic diﬀerential game is analyzed.
More speciﬁcally, we derive the Markov-perfect Nash equilibria of a piecewise
deterministic game.7
The pay-oﬀs of players 1 and 2 are altered to:
F j1 = a0 + a
j
1z +
a2
2 z
2 − d2 (x1)2
F j2 = a0 − aj1z + a22 z2 − d2 (x2)2
(7)
Uncertainty is characterized in the coeﬃcient representing the linear beneﬁts
incurred from liberalization, aji . There exist two states of the world, denoted
by j. In regime 1, a11 = a1. On the other hand, a
2
1 = a1 for regime 2. We
assume that a1 < a1. In the context of the Arab Spring in predominantly oil-
rich economies, regime 1 can be the state when resource windfalls are high.8
Meanwhile, regime 2 can be considered as the scenario during which gains from
oil are low. In regime 1, oil revenues are high, making player 2 even more
reluctant to liberalization. This relatively higher reluctance translates into the
fact that α2(z) worsens in regime 1, compared to regime 2, due to a higher
6 In the numerical cases studied by Wirl, the comparison is quantitatively striking. Indeed,
the ratio of total lobbying expenditures in the MPE compared with the open loop is only
around one third for the symmetric case, and even much less in some asymmetric conﬁgurations
considered.
7We do not consider the piecewise open-loop equilibria as closed-form solutions for this
case are rarely derived in literature (Dockner et al., 2000). For analytical tractability, we thus
focus on feedback strategies.
8In most oil-dependent Arab countries, natural resource rents are usually received by the
governing political elite (Caselli and Cunningham, 2009).
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a1, in absolute terms. This means that, by symmetry, player 1's gains from
liberalization are higher in the ﬁrst regime. Furthermore, the probability to
switch from regime 1 to 2 is denoted as q12 ∈ (0, 1). Similarly, the probability
of switching from regime 2 to 1 is q21 ∈ (0, 1). Depending on the current
regime and taking into account the switching probabilities, players maximize
the discounted net payoﬀs in (7) subject to (1).
As discussed in Dockner et al. (2000), the HJB equations are modiﬁed and
solved for each regime. The HJB equations for the piecewise deterministic game
take the following form:9
rV ji = maxxi
{
F ji +
∂V ji
∂z
z˙ + qj,−j [V
−j
i − V ji ]
}
(8)
Suppose we are in regime 1, the HJB equation for player 1 is denoted as:
rV 11 =
 maxx1
{
a0 + a
j
1z +
a2
2 z
2 − d2 (x1)2 + (B11 + C11z)(x1 − x2)+
+q12[(A
2
1 −A11) + (B21 −B11)z + (C
2
1−C11 )
2 z
2]
} (9)
where we guess that the value function has the following form
V ji (z) = A
j
i +B
j
i z +
Cji
2
z2 i, j = 1, 2.
The ﬁrst-order condition yields:
x11 =
B11 + C
1
1z
d
(10)
Similarly, from player 2's HJB equation, we derive:
x12 = −
B12 + C
1
2z
d
(11)
Substituting x11 and x
1
2 by the expressions given in (10) and (11) in (9), we
obtain for player 1 (disregarding the constant terms):
r(B11z +
C11
2
z2) =
{
a11z +
a2
2 z
2 + 12d (B
1
1 + C
1
1z)
2+
+
(B11+C
1
1z)(B
1
2+C
1
2z)
d + q12[(B
2
1 −B11)z + (C
2
1−C11 )
2 z
2].
(12)
9Compared to the general form of HJBs utilized in Wirl (1994), there is an additional (last)
term which accounts for the possibility of uncertain regime switching from one regime, j, to
the other,−j.
8
Let's now proceed with the identiﬁcation step. From the equation above, we
have the following for player 1:
B11(r + q12 −
C11 + C
1
2
d
) = a11 +
B12C
1
1
d
+ q12B
2
1 (13)
(C11 )
2
2d
− C11 (
r + q12
2
− C
1
2
d
) + q12
C21
2
+
a2
2
= 0 (14)
Similarly, for player 2:
B12(r + q12 −
C11 + C
1
2
d
) = −a11 +
B11C
1
2
d
+ q12B
2
2 (15)
(C12 )
2
2d
− C12 (
r + q12
2
− C
1
1
d
) + q12
C22
2
+
a2
2
= 0 (16)
Suppose instead players are in regime 2. Following the same methodology
as before, we get:
B21(r + q21 −
C21 + C
2
2
d
) = a21 +
B22C
2
1
d
+ q21B
1
1 (17)
(C21 )
2
2d
− C21 (
r + q21
2
− C
2
2
d
) + q21
C11
2
+
a2
2
= 0 (18)
B22(r + q21 −
C21 + C
2
2
d
) = −a21 +
B21C
2
2
d
+ q21B
1
2 (19)
(C22 )
2
2d
− C22 (
r + q21
2
− C
2
1
d
) + q21
C12
2
+
a2
2
= 0 (20)
To identify the parameters relevant for each player, we ﬁrst consider the sys-
tem (14), (16), (18) and (20). Let us assume that Cji parameters are identical for
players in any regime j: Cj1 = C
j
2 for j = 1, 2. Substituting these relationships
into our system, we are left with a system of two equations
3
d (C
1
1 )
2 − (r + q12)C11 + q12C21 + a2 = 0
3
d (C
2
1 )
2 − (r + q21)C21 + q21C11 + a2 = 0 (21)
in two unknowns (C11 , C
2
1 ). Taking the diﬀerence between these two equations,
one obtains:
3
d
[(C11 )
2 − (C21 )2]− (r + q12 + q21) (C11 − C21 ) = 0 (22)
Observing (22), two cases are possible: 1. C11 6= C21 and 2. C11 = C21 .
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• First, suppose that C11 6= C21 . Then, (22) simpliﬁes to:
C21 =
d
3
(r + q12 + q21)− C11 (23)
Using (23), the ﬁrst equation in (21), can be rewritten as
3
d
(C11 )
2 − (r + 2q12)C11 +
dq12
3
(r + q12 + q21) + a2 = 0 (24)
Assuming that ∆1 = r
2 − 12d a2 − 4q12q21 > 0, two solutions thus exist
C1−1 = C
1−
2 = C
1− = d6
(
r + 2q12 −
√
(∆1)
)
C1+1 = C
1+
2 = C
1+ = d6
(
r + 2q12 +
√
(∆1)
) (25)
each corresponding to a particular C21
C2+1 = C
2+
2 = C
2+ = d6
(
r + 2q21 +
√
(∆1)
)
C2−1 = C
2−
2 = C
2− = d6
(
r + 2q21 −
√
(∆1)
) (26)
Speciﬁcally, solutions are (C1−, C2+) and (C1+, C2−).
• Second, consider that C11 = C21 . Then, the C parameter is the same for
both regimes and for both players. It is equal to
C+ = d6
(
r +
√
(∆2)
)
C− = d6
(
r −√(∆2)) (27)
with ∆2 = r
2− 12d a2 > 0 if ∆1 > 0. In this case, players' response to a change in
z is similar to one of Wirl, obtained in the problem with no uncertainty (Section
2).
We now turn to the identiﬁcation ofB-parameters by solving the system (13),
(15), (17), (19). Guessing that Bi2 = −Bi1 for i = 1, 2, this system simpliﬁes to:
B11(r + q12 −
C1
d
) = a11 + q12B
2
1
B21(r + q21 −
C2
d
) = a21 + q21B
1
1
Combining these equations, we obtain the general solution, for B coeﬃcients:
B11 =
(r + q21 − C2d )a11 + q12a21(
r − C2d
) (
r − C1d
)
+ q12
(
r − C2d
)
+ q21
(
r − C1d
) (28)
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B21 =
(r + q12 − C1d )a21 + q21a11(
r − C2d
) (
r − C1d
)
+ q12
(
r − C2d
)
+ q21
(
r − C1d
) (29)
In summary, depending on the particular C considered, there are four po-
tential solutions to our uncertain problem. The ﬁrst type of solution exhibits
identical C-parameters in both regimes. So, each player adapts her strategy to
changes in the liberalization level in the same way, whatever the regime. In
this sense, this solution looks like Wirl's outcome. There also exist solutions
for which Cs parameters change from one regime to the other, which gives rise
to more considerable diﬀerences in players' behavior. The next section investi-
gates the properties of these two types of solutions. Particular attention will be
paid to the impact of uncertainty on players' strategies through the comparison
between solutions for the cases with and without uncertainty.
3.2 Markov Perfect Equilibria with regime-independent
responses to political liberalization
Wirl (1994) has a unique MPE in his deterministic problem. Indeed, he uses a
stability argument to select, among the two possible values of C given in (27),
the negative one. For the sake of comparison, we report players' strategies at
our MPE with identical Cs, given that C = C− (and ∆2 = r2 − 12d a2):10
Proposition 1 Players' eﬀorts, at MPE, are
x11 =
6[(5r+6q21+
√
∆2)a
1
1+6q12a
2
1]
d[5r+
√
∆2)][5r+
√
∆2+6(q12+q21)]
+ 16
[
r −√∆2
]
z,
x12 =
6[(5r+6q21+
√
∆2)a
1
1+6q12a
2
1]
d[5r+
√
∆2][5r+
√
∆2+6(q12+q21)]
− 16
[
r −√∆2
]
z,
x21 =
6[(5r+6q12+
√
∆2)a
2
1+6q21a
1
1]
d[5r+
√
∆2][5r+
√
∆2+6(q12+q21)]
+ 16
[
r −√∆2
]
z,
x22 =
6[(5r+6q12+
√
∆2)a
2
1+6q21a
1
1]
d[5r+
√
∆2][5r+
√
∆2+6(q12+q21)]
− 16
[
r −√∆2
]
z.
(30)
For each regime separately, the dynamics drive the system toward a steady
state with:
z1∞ = z
2
∞ = 0, x
1
i∞ =
6[(5r+6q21+
√
∆2)a
1
1+6q12a
2
1]
d[5r+
√
∆2)][5r+
√
∆2+6(q12+q21)]
and x2i∞ =
6[(5r+6q12+
√
∆2)a
2
1+6q21a
1
1]
d[5r+
√
∆2][5r+
√
∆2+6(q12+q21)]
for i = 1, 2.
(31)
10In our stochastic framework, we also have a solution corresponding to C = C+, which
can't be eliminated using the stability argument. However, straightforward calculations reveal
that this solution has undesirable features: the level of liberalization goes to inﬁnity, which
implies that the liberalization eﬀort of player 2 goes to −∞ (in the absence of nonnegativity
constraint on x). That's why we choose to focus on the other solution, that is also more
consistent with Wirl's outcome.
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One can check that strategies in (30) reduce to Wirl-type MPE, (xN1 , x
N
2 )
deﬁned in (5), when assuming q12 = q21 = 0, a
2
1 = a
1
1 = a1. Besides, at
ﬁrst glance, these strategies share similarities with the ones of the deterministic
situation. In particular, for the solution with identical Cs, the eﬀort of player 1
is always decreasing in z. Regardless of the regime, the opposite holds for player
2. When the level of liberalization is higher, player 1 would have less incentive
to call for reforms as the system is already more favorable to his interests. On
the other hand, a higher z hurts the conservative stance of player 2. Hence, in
order to counteract this, he exerts more eﬀort.
There are however diﬀerences between equilibrium strategies found above
and those derived for the Wirl-type, symmetric case in Section 2.2. Indeed, the
existence of uncertainty plays an integral role in determining the eﬀort levels of
players. In what follows, results found in 2.2 and 3.1 are compared analytically.
For ease of notation, we again denote MPE as the ones found for the uncertain
case (with identical and diﬀerent Cs) and Wirl-type MPE for the certain case.
With a11 > a
2
1, the following proposition can be established.
Proposition 2 • MPE with identical Cs vs. Wirl-type MPE: xNi >
xji for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2 iﬀ the deterministic economy is associated with
a1 = a
1
1. The opposite holds, that is x
N
i < x
j
i iﬀ a1 = a
2
1.
• MPE with identical Cs vs. OLNE at the steady state: When
a1 = a
1
1, it is straightforward that x
O
i∞ > x
j
i∞ for all i and all j since
xOi∞ > x
N
i∞ and x
N
i > x
j
i for all z. When a1 = a
2
1, x
j
i∞ > x
O
i∞, for all i,
for all j, if a21 < aˆ
2
1 with
aˆ21 = a
1
1 ×
36rq21
(5r +
√
∆2)(5r +
√
∆2 + 6(q12 + q21)− 36rq12)
(32)
The proof is relegated to the appendix (see Appendix A). Proposition 2 has
several implications. First, recall that from (30) it can be shown that x1i > x
2
i .
In the MPE with identical Cs, the eﬀorts of players are greater when they are in
a state with high windfalls than when they are in the low regime.This ﬁnding is
analogous to taking
∂xNi
∂a1
for the deterministic, Wirl-type case. An incremental
increase in the coeﬃcient representing the linear beneﬁts from the liberalization
level z implies an increase in the eﬀort levels. All other things constant, the
reformist's investment will rise when a1 goes up. Knowing that this increase
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in a1 may hurt him, the conservative will invest more to counteract player 1's
action.
Second, the impact of uncertainty on the comparative relationship between
the MPE with identical Cs and the Wirl-type MPE is not clear-cut. Uncer-
tainty lowers the equilibrium investment levels in comparison to the case when
a1 is surely in a high state. Assume that players are in Regime 1 at the present.
Knowing that there is a probability that the regime will shift to a setting with
low windfalls, players have less incentive to impact liberalization (i.e. relative to
the scenario when they are certain that they will always be in Regime 1). Con-
sequently, we ﬁnd the following relationship: xNi > x
j
i when a1 = a
1
1. Contrast
this to the case when a1 = a
2
1. Indeed, the opposite occurs when comparing our
MPE to the Wirl-type MPE for the low state. Suppose players are in Regime
2. Since there is a possibility that the regime will alter to a system with higher
windfalls, they invest more. Indeed, because of an anticipation of a potential
shift to the high state, the MPE with identical Cs is higher relative to the
Wirl-type MPE for the low state: xNi < x
j
i .
Third, the steady state levels of the MPE with identical Cs and the OLNE
can be compared. When a1 = a
1
1 (high state regime), the open-loop equilibrium
investments are greater than the MPE with identical Cs when z∞ = 0. Similar to
the deterministic case, players exert relatively less eﬀort into aﬀecting the level
of political liberalization. This is because feedback strategies among players
are characterized by a dynamic retaliation mechanism. For instance, whenever
Player 1 triumphs in shifting the liberalization level towards his favor, she knows
that Player 2 will retaliate more. AsWirl (1994) argued, this common knowledge
actually deters aggressive strategies. However, this is not the case when a1 = a
2
1.
In particular, the above-mentioned observation does not apply when a21 is low
enough. At the steady state, the OLNE for the symmetric case in the low
state is below the MPE with identical Cs. Even in the potential presence of
retaliation, the existence of uncertainty induces players to exert more eﬀort
compared to the OLNE in the low state. Remember that for the Wirl-type
solution, players know that they will always be in the low state. Compare this
when they are facing uncertainty. That is, suppose they are currently in regime
2. The possibility of shifting to regime 1 may imply more aggressive investment.
As a result, the cost of lobbying along the MPE equilibria under uncertainty
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might be signiﬁcantly increased with respect to Wirl's deterministic benchmark.
In the context of the political libearlization process at stake in Arab countries,
this highlights the property that the uncertainty related to the oil rents, a
fundamental ingredient of the game in these countries, is likely to generate
signiﬁcant social costs inherent in the game contrary to what is predicted by the
standard deterministic theory. The larger this uncertainty, the larger the social
costs as strategies will become more aggressive. In other words, independently
of the well-known economic costs associated with volatility of resource prices in
exporting countries, this volatility will make the political liberalization process
itself more costly adding to the latter. Another complication of uncertainty is
the emergence of alternative strategies which do not show up in deterministic
frameworks.
3.3 Markov perfect equilibria with regime-driven responses
to changes in liberalization
The solution discussed in the preceding section can be contrasted with a (C1, C2)-
type of solution, with C1, C2 given in (25)-(26). In this case, players' reaction
to a change in the liberalization level is dependent on the particular regime in
which the economy is lying. Let us see how this regime-driven reaction impacts
on the properties of the solution. For that purpose, in the next proposition we
present equilibrium strategies for the case where C1 = C1−, C2 = C2+, and
∆1 = r
2− 12d a2−4q12q21. Then, a discussion about the features of this solution
and how it compares to the Wirl-type MPE is conducted.11
Proposition 3 Suppose there exists a MPE with regime-driven response to
changes in liberalization, then the strategies are given by
x11 =
6[(5r+4q21−
√
∆1)a
1
1+6q12a
2
1]
d[(5r−
√
∆1)(5r+
√
∆1)+4
√
∆1(q21−q12)+20(r(q12+q21)−q12q21)] +
1
6
(
r + 2q12 −
√
∆1
)
z,
x12 =
6[(5r+4q21−
√
∆1)a
1
1+6q12a
2
1]
d[(5r−
√
∆1)(5r+
√
∆1)+4
√
∆1(q21−q12)+20(r(q12+q21)−q12q21)] −
1
6
(
r + 2q12 −
√
∆1
)
z,
x21 =
6[(5r+4q12+
√
∆1)a
2
1+6q21a
1
1]
d[(5r−
√
∆1)(5r+
√
∆1)+4
√
∆1(q21−q12)+20(r(q12+q21)−q12q21)] +
1
6
(
r + 2q21 +
√
∆1
)
z,
x22 =
6[(5r+4q12+
√
∆1)a
2
1+6q21a
1
1]
d[(5r−
√
∆1)(5r+
√
∆1)+4
√
∆1(q21−q12)+20(r(q12+q21)−q12q21)] −
1
6
(
r + 2q21 +
√
∆1
)
z.
(33)
11The conclusions drawn from analysis of the other MPE candidate, corresponding to
(C1+, C2−), are qualitatively similar to the ones obtained for (C1−, C2+). For this reason,
this case is not dealt with by the subsequent study.
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It's out of the scope of this paper to provide a full analysis of the ergodicity
properties of the solutions. However, we can mention some distinctive features of
the alternative MPEs through a separate analysis of our two regimes involved.
Paying attention to regime 2, from (33), we observe that the limit value of
z is inﬁnite, positive or negative depending on the sign of the initial level of
liberalization z0. As mentioned in footnote 11, this means that if the economy
were to stay in regime 2 for a suﬃciently long interval of time, then player 2's
eﬀort would become negative. It is also worth checking how the system behaves
in regime 1. Indeed, it turns out that regime 1's dynamics are qualitatively
similar to the ones of regime 2 when one assumes
− 3a2
d
< q12(r + q12 + q21), (34)
because under this condition, C1−, C2+ > 0.
Given that the economy randomly switches from regime 1 to regime 2, and
vice-versa, one may prefer imposing the opposite of (34). In that case, dynamics
of regime 1 are similar to the ones holding at the Wirl-type MPE or at our MPE
with identical response to changes in liberalization. It implies that the limit
value of z would be zero whereas x11 and x
1
2 would reach ﬁnite values.
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Several observations can be noted from the comparison of the solution in
Proposition 3 and the Wirl-type MPE.
First, the impact of an increase in z on eﬀort levels is very diﬀerent from
what observed for the Wirl-type MPE (and the MPE with identical Cs). From
(33), notice the obvious eﬀect of a higher z on the eﬀorts of players in the second
regime. In regime 2, player 1's (player2) investment increases (decreases) with
z. Regardless of the switching probabilities, regime 2 always induces the above-
mentioned results. The low state of a21 gives greater incentive to player 1 to exert
more eﬀort when z increases. This is because he wants to take more advantage
from political liberalization. There exists a form of intensiﬁed reinforcement. In
contrast, when z goes up, player 2 knows it becomes more favorable to player
1. Knowing that exerting eﬀort is costly, it is actually strategic for player 2 to
lessen his investment. When z already acquired a much higher level, it might
be more diﬃcult for him to shift the system to his favor. There is deterrence in
his incentive to change the system.
12Thus, in some sense, the dynamical system valid in regime 1 oﬀsets the explosive trend
of regime 2.
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From the discussion above, the reasoning is less obvious for regime 1. The
ﬁndings are similar to those in regime 2 only when Condition (34) is satisﬁed.
This is all the more likely, given that switching probabilities are high enough. In
this case, the strategy of player 1 increases with respect to the state z while the
opposite is relevant for player 2. Indeed, when the C-parameters are diﬀerent,
the impact of uncertainty becomes more prominent. Interestingly, the results
become the inverse of those observed for the deterministic, Wirl type MPE.
Suppose players are currently in regime 1. Given a relatively high probability
of switching to regime 2, an incremental increase in z induces player 1 to exert
more eﬀort. This happens because player 1 knows that she obtains less linear
beneﬁts from liberalization in regime 2 (due to lower a1). With the anticipation
that he might be in regime 2 the next period, player 1 tries to compensate and
invests more aggressively in the favorable regime 1. In contrast, player 2's eﬀort
in regime 1 decreases with z when the likelihood of switching to regime 2 is high
enough. Given that regime 2 is more favorable to player 2, i.e. a1 is reasonably
lower, then he has less incentive to invest in regime 1.
If Condition (34) does not hold, then the results in regime 1 are similar to
those found in the MPE with identical Cs and the Wirl-type MPE. Indeed, when
players are in regime 1 and the probability of switching to regime 2 is rather
low, their incentives are diﬀerent from those observed when they are regime
2. Knowing that there is a higher likelihood that he will stay in the favorable
regime 1, player 1 invests less when political liberalization is more prevalent.
Meanwhile, a higher z combined with being in regime 1 harms the other player
more. Player 2 mitigates this by trying to shift the system to his favor, i.e.
exert more eﬀort against liberalization.
Finally, it is worth noting that when a2 = 0, the MPE strategies are constant
for the Wirl-type MPE and the solution with identical Cs. However, because
switching probabilities appear in the solution for diﬀerent Cs, this is not the case
for the MPE with dissimilar C-parameters. The strategies of players in the MPE
with diﬀerent Cs still vary with z. Taking into account the role of uncertainty
(i.e. C varies for each regime), the eﬀort levels do not remain constant. Player
1's (player 2) eﬀort is always increasing (decreasing) in z. The explanation for
this result utilizes a similar logic as above.
16
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a dynamic game of political liberalization
under uncertainty. This is done by using the context of the Arab Spring in
resource-rich countries. It has been observed that eﬀort levels of reformists
(those who beneﬁt from greater liberalization) and conservatives (those who are
against liberalization) tend to diﬀer depending on the setup of the game. In the
case with no uncertainty, the strategy of the reformist decreases with respect
to the liberalization level while the opposite is true for the conservative. In
striking diﬀerence, opposite results were observed in the case with uncertainty.
When the regime switching probabilities are high enough, the reformist's eﬀort
increases with respect to the state z. On the other hand, the conservative's
investment decreases with intensiﬁed political liberalization. In the presence of
uncertainty and greater likelihood of regime shift, an increase in z reinforces
the reformist's incentive to induce change. In contrast, when z goes up, the
conservative is in a less favorable position and is surprisingly deterred from
altering the system. Finally, it is also shown that in certain circumstances, the
cost of lobbying might be signiﬁcantly increased under uncertainty with respect
to Wirl's benchmark. In the context of the political libearlization process at
stake in Arab countries, this means that the uncertainty related to the oil rents
is likely to generate signiﬁcant social costs. As mentioned before, this implies
that increased rents volatility will make the political liberalization process itself
more costly adding to the well-known economic costs associated with volatility
of resource prices in exporting countries.
Subject to analytical tractability, the present model may be extended in the
following directions. First, one may introduce uncertainty in the cost functions,
e.g. it is less costly to invest in regime 1 than in 2. Second, one may explore
a diﬀerent stochastic environment by incorporating a Wiener-type process that
may aﬀect the evolution of political liberalization.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
A.1 MPE with identical Cs vs. Wirl-type MPE
Here we compare the MPE in the deterministic case is (Wirl-type results):
xNi = 6
a1
d
[
5r +
√
(r2 − 12d a2)
] ± 1
6
[
r −
√
(r2 − 12
d
a2)
]
z,
with the MPE obtained with uncertain regime switching and identical Cs. In
regime 1,
x1i = 6
[5r + 6q21 +
√
(r2 − 12d a2)]a11 + 6q12a21
d
[
5r +
√
(r2 − 12d a2)
] [
5r +
√
(r2 − 12d a2) + 6(q12 + q21)
]±1
6
[
r −
√
(r2 − 12
d
a2)
]
z,
and in regime 2,
x2i = 6
[5r + 6q12 +
√
(r2 − 12d a2)]a21 + 6q21a11
d
[
5r +
√
(r2 − 12d a2)
] [
5r +
√
(r2 − 12d a2) + 6(q12 + q21)
]±1
6
[
r −
√
(r2 − 12
d
a2)
]
z.
• Let us ﬁrst consider that the deterministic a1 is the high one: a1 = a11.
Then, it is trivial to show that xji < x
N
j ⇔ a21 < a11 for i, j = 1, 2 and for all z.
This is satisﬁed by deﬁnition.
• Next, suppose that the deterministic a1 is the one corresponding to regime
2: a1 = a
2
1. Then, one can check easily that x
j
i > x
N
i ⇔ a21 < a11 for i, j = 1, 2
and for all z, which is true by deﬁnition.
A.2 MPE with identical Cs vs. OLNE at the steady state
Again, we make a distinction between two cases, depending on whether the
deterministic a1 is the high one or not. Following Wirl (1994), attention is paid
only to the steady state.
When a1 = a
1
1, the comparison is straightforward: from what we learnt in
the preceding appendix, we know that xji < x
N
i for all z. In particular, it holds
that xji∞ < x
N
i∞ (recall that in both cases, z∞ = 0). In addition, Wirl (1994)
has shown that xNi∞ < x
O
i∞. So, we have x
j
i∞ < x
O
i∞ for all i, j = 1, 2.
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When a1 = a
2
1, the comparison is less obvious because, at the same time,
xji∞ > x
N
i∞ and x
N
i∞ < x
O
i∞. In regime 1, from the deﬁnition of the open-loop
solution (see 3) , x1i∞ < x
O
i∞ ⇔[
(5r +
√
∆2)(5r + 6(q12q21) +
√
∆2)− 36rq12
]
a21 < 6r(5 + 6q21 +
√
∆2)a
1
1.
Note that the coeﬃcient in the LHS is larger than the one in the RHS. So, given
that a11 > a
2
1, x
1
i∞ < x
O
i∞ is equivalent to
a21 <
6r(5 + 6q21 +
√
∆2)[
(5r +
√
∆2)(5r + 6(q12q21) +
√
∆2)− 36rq12
]a11,
this deﬁnes an upper bound a˜21 on the coeﬃcient a1 valid in the low regime.
In regime 2, following the same approach, we obtain that x2i∞ < x
O
i∞ ⇔[
(5r +
√
∆2)(5r + 6(q12q21) +
√
∆2)− 6r(5r + 6q12 +
√
∆2)
]
a21 < 36rq21a
1
1,
the coeﬃcient in the LHS being again larger than the one in the RHS. Hence,
x2i∞ < x
O
i∞ is equivalent to
a21 <
36rq21[
(5r +
√
∆2)(5r + 6(q12q21) +
√
∆2)− 36rq12
]a11,
this deﬁnes a second boundary aˆ21 on the coeﬃcient a1 valid in the low regime.
Now, given that a˜21 > aˆ
2
1, a
2
1 < aˆ
2
1 implies that x
j
i∞ < x
O
i∞ for i, j = 1, 2
when a1 = a
2
1.
This completes the proof.
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